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The DOJ’s Role in the Franchise No-Poach 
Problem 
MOLLY EDGAR† 
In 2016, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued a 
joint policy statement which notified human resource professionals of antitrust issues that may 
arise in the context of employee recruitment, hiring, and compensation. Among the various issues 
that the Agencies addressed was the use of no-poach agreements by employers. The Agencies 
stated that naked no-poach agreements, agreements between employers at different companies to 
refuse to solicit or hire one another’s employees, are per se illegal under federal antitrust law. 
Three years later, in a case involving a no-poach agreement, the DOJ filed a statement of interest 
that departed from the seemingly bright-line rule set forth in its previous joint policy statement. 
The DOJ took the position that the nature of the franchise system warrants an exception to the 
general rule—that naked no-poach agreements among employers are per se illegal—and 
suggested that the rule of reason analysis is the appropriate framework.  
Since the DOJ issued its policy statement and subsequent statement of interest, federal district 
courts have taken varying approaches to franchise no-poach cases. Most have declined to 
determine the governing standard at the motion to dismiss stage due in part to the lack of 
agreement between the DOJ and other authorities of antitrust law, including some state attorneys 
general and the American Antitrust Institute. By adopting the per se standard, courts could easily 
dispose of franchise no-poach cases and thereby conserve judicial resources and create 
uniformity for litigants. The use of the per se standard to review franchise no-poach agreements 
comports with existing antitrust precedent, and the DOJ’s contrary arguments mischaracterize 
the nature of the franchise industry. Courts should decline to follow the DOJ’s reasoning in its 
statement of interest and impose per se liability for franchises that use no-poach agreements. 
Additionally, under the new administration, the DOJ should revisit the issue to reconcile its 
position with Sherman Act jurisprudence and its own previous guidance and enforcement actions. 
 
 †  J.D. Candidate 2021, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; Symposium Editor, 
Hastings Law Journal. I would like to thank Professor Samuel Miller and Professor Ryan Sandrock for teaching 
the antitrust seminar that inspired this Note. I would also like to thank the Hastings Law Journal staff for their 
hard work and helpful feedback. Finally, I would like to thank my parents for their endless support and 
encouragement. 
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INTRODUCTION 
While antitrust law is not a remedy for resolving every societal ill,1 it is 
undoubtedly an important tool for preventing anticompetitive conduct in the 
labor market. In enacting the Sherman Act, Congress understood the broad 
implications of corporate power, and Senator John Sherman, the namesake of 
the law, warned that monopoly power can harm workers.2 Anticompetitive 
conduct in the labor market produces the same three “evils” that animate 
antitrust law: anticompetitive prices, lower quantities, and lower quality.3  
Although antitrust law generally addresses anticompetitive conduct in 
product markets, employers can act in ways that restrain trade in labor markets.4 
Even if employers do not compete with one another in the same product market, 
those same employers may compete with one another for employees in the labor 
market.5 When employers enter agreements with one another and those 
agreements restrain trade in the labor market, employers are subject to liability 
under section 1 of the Sherman Act.6  
In the past few years, antitrust enforcers at the federal and state levels have 
become increasingly concerned with one particular type of agreement among 
employers: no-poach agreements.7 No-poach agreements typically involve two 
or more employers who agree to not hire one another’s employees.8 Although 
no-poach agreements are similar to non-compete agreements with respect to 
their potential effects on the labor market, no-poach agreements differ because 
they are entered into by employers, and employees are not parties to the 
agreement.9 In 2016, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) issued a joint policy statement (“2016 Joint Policy”), 
directed at human resource professionals, that addressed no-poach agreements.10 
The guidelines established that naked no-poach agreements among employers 
 
 1. Antitrust and Economic Opportunity: Competition in Labor Markets: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Antitrust, Com., and Admin. L. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 1 (2019) (statement of Doha 
Mekki, Counsel to the Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice) [hereinafter 
Statement of Doha Mekki]. 
 2. Id. at 1–⁠2 (“[M]onopoly power . . . commands the price of labor without fear of strikes . . . .” (quoting 
21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890)). 
 3. State Attorneys General, Comment on Federal Trade Commission Hearings on Competition and 
Comsumer Protection in the 21st Century 2 (July 15, 2019), https://oag.dc.gov/sites/default/files/2019-
07/State_AGs_Comments_to_FTC_on_Labor_Issues_in_Antitrust.pdf. 
 4. JOSÉ AZAR, IOANA MARINESCU & MARSHALL STEINBAUM, ANTITRUST AND LABOR MARKET POWER 3 
(2019), https://econfip.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Antitrust-and-Labor-Market-Power.pdf. 
 5. PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST 
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 2012c (4th and 5th eds. 2020).  
 6. Id. 
 7. See Donald J. Polden, Restraints on Workers’ Wages and Mobility: No-Poach Agreements and the 
Antitrust Laws, 59 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 579, 582 (2020). 
 8. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 2013a. 
 9. Id. ¶ 2013b. 
 10. See DEP’T OF JUST. ANTITRUST DIV. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDANCE FOR HUMAN 
RESOURCE PROFESSIONALS (2016), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/903511/download [hereinafter 2016 JOINT 
POLICY STATEMENT]. 
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constitute per se violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act and may warrant 
criminal liability.11 Although the DOJ and FTC’s position on no-poach 
agreements appears clear from their 2016 guidance, an important question has 
since emerged: whether that position extends to the franchise context.  
This question came to the forefront three years after the DOJ’s joint 
statement with the FTC—when the DOJ intervened in a 2019 case challenging 
a franchise’s no-poach agreement (“Statement of Interest”).12 The DOJ argued 
that, in the franchise sector, courts should evaluate the use of no-poach 
agreements on a case-by-case basis because they are not necessarily per se 
illegal.13 The Statement of Interest appears to depart from the 2016 Joint Policy 
announced by the DOJ and FTC, the two federal enforcers of antitrust law. 
Shortly after the DOJ filed its Statement of Interest, another key player in the 
antitrust arena, the American Antitrust Institute, issued a letter in response.14 The 
letter criticized the DOJ’s suggestion that franchise no-poach agreements should 
be subject to the rule of reason and argued that these agreements are 
anticompetitive, harmful to labor-market competition, and serve no legitimate 
business purpose.15 Lacking clear guidance, federal courts in various districts 
have taken inconsistent approaches in their review of franchise no-poach 
agreements.16 Due to the significant number of franchise systems that use no-
 
 11. Id. at 3–4. 
 12. See Corrected Statement of Int. of the United States, Stigar v. Dough Dough, Inc., No. 2:18-cv-00244 
(E.D Wash. Mar. 8, 2019), Richmond v. Bergey Pullman Inc., No. 218-cv-00246 (E.D. Wash. Mar. 8, 2019), 
Harris v. CJ Star LLC, No. 218-cv-00247 (E.D. Wash. Mar. 8, 2019), ECF No. 34 [hereinafter DOJ’s Statement 
of Interest]. 
 13. Id. at 11–12, 16–17. 
 14. See Letter from Diana Moss, President, Am. Antitrust Inst., and Randy Stutz, Vice President, Am. 
Antitrust Inst., to Hon. Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., and Michael Murray, Deputy 
Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just. (May 2, 2019), https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/05/AAI-No-Poach-Letter-w-Abstract.pdf [hereinafter American Antitrust Institute 
Letter]. 
 15. Id.  
 16.  See, e.g., Butler v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, 331 F. Supp. 3d 786, 795 (S.D. Ill. 2018) (holding 
that the plaintiff stated a claim against the franchisees under the hub-and-spoke theory of violation); Arrington 
v. Burger King Worldwide, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 3d 1322, 1332 (S.D. Fla. 2020) (finding that plaintiff failed to 
state a claim because franchisees are not “separate economic actors for antitrust purposes”); Ogden v. Little 
Caesar Enters., Inc., 393 F. Supp. 3d 622, 630–35 (E.D. Mich. 2019) (holding that the plaintiff failed to establish 
that no-poach agreements are per se unreasonable); Blanton v. Domino’s Pizza Franchising LLC, No. 18-13207, 
2019 WL 2247731, at *4–5 (E.D. Mich. May 24, 2019) (holding that plaintiff successfully pled an antitrust 
violation but declining to determine the proper approach until further factual development); Fuentes v. Royal 
Dutch Shell PLC, No. CV 18-5174, 2019 WL 7584654, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2019) (denying defendant’s 
motion to dismiss for the Sherman Act claim because the plaintiff plausibly alleged a “horizontal” conspiracy); 
Robinson v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., No. 19-9066 (SDW) (LDW), 2019 WL 5617512, at *6–7 (D.N.J. Oct. 31, 
2019) (holding that plaintiff stated a claim for a Sherman Act violation but declining to determine the applicable 
standard of review); In re Papa John’s Emp. & Franchisee Emp. Antitrust Litig., No. 3:18-CV-00825-JHM, 2019 
WL 5386484, at *7–10 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 21, 2019) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the claims of antitrust 
violations). 
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poach agreements,17 the standard that courts adopt to review these no-poach 
agreements will inevitably affect millions of workers across the country.18  
This Note will evaluate the DOJ’s arguments against the application of the 
per se standard to no-poach agreements in the franchise context, illustrate the 
problems with anticompetitive conduct in the labor market through a case 
example, and ultimately advocate for courts to reject the DOJ’s position as it is 
articulated in its Statement of Interest. To preserve competition in the labor 
market and protect workers, courts should decline to follow the DOJ’s proposal 
and instead apply the per se standard to evaluate no-poach provisions in 
franchise agreements.  
Part I of this Note discusses the current dispute regarding the appropriate 
standard to evaluate no-poach agreements and identifies flaws in the DOJ’s 
arguments in favor of the rule of reason standard. Part II will highlight the 
Department of Justice’s departure from its previous position on the issue and its 
role in shaping section 1 jurisprudence. Part III concludes this Note by 
emphasizing important policy considerations underlying the debate regarding 
the appropriate standard and why sound public policy requires either the per se 
approach or legislation that bans these agreements entirely. 
I.  CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE DOJ’S POSITION AND SECTION 1 
JURISPRUDENCE 
This Part first provides a background of section 1 jurisprudence to both 
demonstrate how no-poach agreements operate in the franchise context and also, 
to frame the dispute regarding the appropriate standard under which to review 
these agreements. This Part will additionally outline the arguments in support of 
the per se approach to franchise no-poach cases. Lastly, this Part addresses each 
of the DOJ’s arguments in support of the rule of reason approach and highlights 
the flaws in its reasoning. 
A. BACKGROUND 
To state a cause of action under section 1 of the Sherman Act,19 the plaintiff 
must show: (1) there was an agreement, conspiracy, or combination between two 
or more entities; (2) the agreement was an unreasonable restraint of trade; and 
(3) the restraint affected interstate commerce.20 To analyze whether an 
agreement is an unreasonable restraint of trade, courts analyze the agreement at 
 
 17. See Rachel Abrams, Why Aren’t Paychecks Growing? A Burger-Joint Clause Offers a Clue, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/27/business/pay-growth-fast-food-hiring.html. 
 18. American Antitrust Institute Letter, supra note 14, at 1. 
 19. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018). 
 20. Am. Ad Mgmt., Inc. v. GTE Corp., 92 F.3d 781, 784 (9th Cir. 1996).  
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issue under one of three standards: per se, quick look,21 or rule of reason.22 The 
rule of reason is the default standard of analysis.23 Under the rule of reason 
standard, after a plaintiff satisfies his burden to show the existence of an 
agreement, market power, and a prima facie anticompetitive restraint on the 
relevant market, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate the 
agreement’s procompetitive effects.24 The court then weighs the procompetitive 
benefits of the agreement against its anticompetitive effects in the relevant 
geographic and product market.25 On the other hand, if the agreement at issue is 
so inherently anticompetitive, courts will depart from the default rule of reason 
standard and apply the per se approach.26 If an agreement is deemed per se 
unreasonable, the court will not consider any of the defendant’s purported 
procompetitive justifications for the agreement.27  
Both private parties and government enforcement agencies have invoked 
section 1 of the Sherman Act to address the widespread use of no-poach 
agreements in the labor market.28 These agreements involve two or more 
entities, often competitors, that agree to not hire one another’s employees.29 
Although this practice has been implemented in a variety of industries, including 
technology30 and healthcare,31 it has become increasingly widespread in the 
franchise industry.32 In this context, no-poach agreements are typically entered 
into by the franchisor and individual franchisees. Private plaintiffs and state 
enforcement officials have challenged these franchise agreements as unlawful 
 
 21. The quick look analysis is a truncated rule-of-reason analysis. It is appropriate when “an observer with 
even a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements in question would have 
an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets.” Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999). 
Because the quick look analysis is a truncated form of the rule of reason, this Note does not separately analyze 
a quick look approach to franchise no-poach agreements. 
 22. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 1500. 
 23. See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977). 
 24. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 1914c. 
 25. See GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 49. 
 26. See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2283–84 (2018); see also Broad. Music, Inc. v. 
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1979) (explaining that courts consider “whether the practice 
facially appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output” 
to determine whether an agreement is per se illegal). 
 27. See Broad. Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 7–9. 
 28. See Rochella T. Davis, Talent Can’t Be Allocated: A Labor Economics Justification for No-Poaching 
Agreement Criminality in Antitrust Regulation, 12 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 279, 302 (2018). 
 29. Id. at 281. 
 30. See Press Release, Off. of Pub. Affs., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Requires Six High Tech 
Companies to Stop Entering into Anticompetitive Employee Solicitation Agreements (Sept. 24, 2010), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-requires-six-high-tech-companies-stop-entering-
anticompetitive-employee [https://perma.cc/Q55X-7AMY]. 
 31. See Jeff Miles, The Nursing Shortage, Wage-Information Sharing Among Competing Hospitals, and 
the Antitrust Laws: The Nurse Wages Antitrust Litigation, 7 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 305 (2007). 
 32. Abrams, supra note 17. 
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restraints of trade in violation of state antitrust laws33 and section 1 of the 
Sherman Act.34  
However, a dispute has emerged regarding the correct standard under 
which these agreements should be evaluated. The DOJ argues that the rule of 
reason standard, which is more favorable to defendants,35 should apply when no-
poach agreements are implemented by franchise systems.36 Meanwhile, private 
plaintiffs and state enforcement authorities argue that these arguments ignore 
important realities about the nature of the franchise sector and the way in which 
no-poach agreements operate in that context.37 By demonstrating the similarities 
between no-poach agreements and other horizontal agreements that antitrust law 
has long regarded to be per se unlawful, plaintiffs make compelling arguments 
that the same standard should apply. 
B. ARGUMENTS FOR THE PER SE APPROACH TO FRANCHISE NO-POACH 
AGREEMENTS 
Plaintiffs often analogize no-poach agreements to price-fixing agreements. 
It is well-established in antitrust law that price-fixing agreements are per se 
violations of section 1.38 Under antitrust law, buyers, like sellers, can be liable 
for horizontal agreements that restrain trade.39 In this context, franchisees are 
buyers of labor in the labor market, as they pay wages in exchange for labor.40 
Challengers argue that franchisees that participate in these no-poach agreements 
engage in a form of price-fixing by effectively suppressing wages.41 Analogous 
to the way in which a firm may offer discounts to attract buyers to purchase its 
products rather than a competitor’s products, firms may offer higher wages than 
their competitors to attract employees.42 In labor markets free from artificial 
restraints,43 firms are incentivized to maintain labor relations and employment 
 
 33. See, e.g., Complaint at 1, 14–15, Washington v. Jersey Mike’s Franchise Sys. Inc., No. 18-2-25822-
7SEA (Wash. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 2018). 
 34. See, e.g., Class Action Complaint at 1, 38–39, Butler v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, 331 F. Supp. 
3d 786 (S.D. Ill. 2018) (No. 3:18-CV-00133). 
 35. See Clayton J. Masterman, Note, The Customer Is Not Always Right: Balancing Worker and Customer 
Welfare in Antitrust Law, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1387, 1393–94 (2016). 
 36. See DOJ’s Statement of Interest, supra note 12. 
 37. See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 17, Butler, 331 
F. Supp. 3d 786 (No. 3:18-CV-00133). 
 38. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 305b. 
 39. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 235 (1948) (holding that the 
purchasers faced antitrust liability even though the sellers were injured, not necessarily the consumers). 
 40. RANDY M. STUTZ, AM. ANTITRUST INST., THE EVOLVING ANTITRUST TREATMENT OF LABOR-MARKET 
RESTRAINTS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 2 (2018), https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2018/09/AAI-Labor-Antitrust-White-Paper_0-1.pdf. 
 41. Alan B. Krueger & Orley Ashenfelter, Theory and Evidence on Employer Collusion in the Franchise 
Sector 9 (Princeton Univ. Indus. Rels. Section, Working Paper No. 614, 2017), https://dataspace.princeton.edu/ 
bitstream/88435/dsp014f16c547g/3/614.pdf. 
 42. Id. at 16. 
 43. See Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 248 F.3d 131, 140–41 (3d Cir. 2001) (acknowledging that a labor market 
is a market for antitrust purposes). 
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practices that attract qualified employees. It is typically undisputed in these cases 
that in order to provide quality customer service, franchisees seek qualified and 
capable employees.44 Due to the lack of geographical exclusivity that is 
characteristic of a typical franchise arrangement, franchisees compete with one 
another to obtain these employees.45 If a qualified individual were to seek 
employment with a franchisee, he or she may have multiple locations from 
which to choose within a certain geographical region. The use of no-poach 
agreements in the labor market eliminates the possibility that employees will 
leave a firm to seek employment at a similar competing firm, thereby reducing 
the pressure on firms to offer competitive wages. Challengers of no-poach 
agreements argue that the use of these restrictive agreements in the franchise 
industry has restrained competition for labor and thus disincentivized 
franchisees from implementing practices to attract qualified employees.46  
Antitrust law has recognized that agreements that restrict the supply of 
labor in the market constitute a naked restraint on price and output.47 In FTC v. 
Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association, a group of lawyers agreed to refuse 
to serve as court-appointed counsel for indigent criminal defendants in order to 
demand higher wages.48 The boycott created an artificial restriction on the 
supply of labor in the legal services market.49 By reducing output of labor and 
thus increasing the demand, the price of legal services increased.50 The U.S. 
Supreme Court held that the boycott amounted to a horizontal price fixing 
arrangement because the boycott restrained the output of labor and increased its 
price in the market.51 Accordingly, the Court rejected the Court of Appeals’ 
finding that the per se rules did not apply.52 Plaintiffs typically argue that no-
poach agreements between franchisees similarly restrain the output of labor in a 
given market.53 By preventing franchisees from hiring employees at other 
locations within the same franchise system, the agreements restrict employee 
mobility and thus limit the amount of available labor in the market at any given 
 
 44. For example, Jimmy John’s noted that franchisee staff are vital to its success and in order to keep 
customers, Jimmy John’s franchisees must maintain a “high level of customer service.” Class Action Complaint, 
supra note 34, at 14. 
 45. Id. at 15. 
 46. See, e.g., ALAN KRUEGER & ERIC POSNER, A PROPOSAL FOR PROTECTING LOW-INCOME WORKERS 
FROM MONOPSONY AND COLLUSION 4–5 (2018), https://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/protecting_low_ 
income_workers_from_monopsony_collusion_krueger_posner_pp.pdf. 
 47. See FTC v. Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 422–23 (1990). 
 48. Id. at 414. 
 49. Id. at 423. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 423. 
 52. Id. at 436. 
 53. See, e.g., Competitive Impact Statement at 8, United States v. Adobe Sys., Inc., No. 10 CV 1629, 2011 
WL 10883994 (D.D.C. Mar. 18, 2011) (No. 1:10-CV-01629). 
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time.54 The restriction on labor output resultantly precludes wage negotiation 
between employers and employees.55  
The use of no-poach agreements in the franchise sector is also challenged 
under the theory that the agreements amount to unlawful market-division 
agreements, which are typically per se illegal.56 Horizontal market-division 
agreements are agreements among actual or potential competitors not to compete 
with one another in certain geographic areas, in offering certain products or 
services, or in serving certain customers.57 Like naked horizontal price-fixing 
agreements, market-division agreements are per-se unlawful under antitrust law 
because they enable participants to reduce output in a market and increase 
prices.58 Antitrust law does not treat employment markets differently from 
product markets; therefore, “[a]n agreement among employers that they will not 
compete against each other for the services of a particular employee or 
prospective employee is, in fact, a service division agreement, analogous to a 
product division agreement.”59 Under this view, by creating an artificial restraint 
on an employee’s ability to seek employment at another franchisee, no-poach 
agreements allocate available labor among competitors.60 Rather than allocating 
customers in a particular market, which is widely recognized as per se illegal,61 
the franchisees are allocating employees.  
C. THE DOJ’S ARGUMENTS FOR THE RULE OF REASON APPROACH TO 
FRANCHISE NO-POACH AGREEMENTS 
Defendants in these lawsuits,62 and more recently, the DOJ,63 essentially 
argue that no-poach agreements operate differently in the franchise context and 
therefore require analysis under the rule of reason. In its Statement of Interest, 
the DOJ argued that the rule of reason standard should govern no-poach 
agreements in the franchise context because: (1) the parties to the franchise 
agreement containing the no-poach provision are the franchisor and the 
individual franchisee and therefore the agreement is vertical; (2) the franchisor 
and the franchisee are treated as a single entity; and (3) the no-poach agreement 
 
 54. Krueger & Ashenfelter, supra note 41, at 9. 
 55. No-Poach Approach: Division Update Spring 2019, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/ 
atr/division-operations/division-update-spring-2019/no-poach-approach (Sept. 30, 2019). 
 56. Michael Murray, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Remarks at the Santa Clara 
University School of Law 12–13 (Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1142111/download. 
 57. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 2013b. 
 58. Id. ¶ 2030a. 
 59. United States v. eBay, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1039 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (alteration in original) 
(quoting AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 2013b). 
 60. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 2013a–b. 
 61. Id. ¶ 1652b. 
 62. See, e.g., Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint 
Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(B)(1) and 12(B)(6) at 2, Butler v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, 
331 F. Supp. 3d 786 (S.D. Ill. 2018) (No. 3:18-CV-00133) [hereinafter Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of 
Their Motion to Dismiss]. 
 63. See DOJ’s Statement of Interest, supra note 12, at 11–12. 
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is ancillary to a legitimate and procompetitive joint venture.64 These arguments, 
addressed in Subparts 1 through 3, ignore important aspects of franchise systems 
and should be rejected by courts. 
1. Horizontal v. Vertical Restraint  
Restraints under section 1 are generally categorized as either “horizontal” 
or “vertical.”65 Horizontal restraints are agreements made among competitors at 
the same level in a market.66 Vertical restraints are made between entities at 
different levels of a supply chain, such as between a manufacturer and a 
retailer.67 In order to successfully demonstrate a horizontal agreement, the 
plaintiff must show that the parties to the agreement are competitors at the same 
level in the relevant market.68 In the franchise sector, franchisees compete with 
one another for not only customers but for employees.69 Owners of franchisees 
generally enter franchise agreements with the understanding that franchisees are 
not guaranteed exclusive, protected, or territorial rights in the market area of 
their restaurant location.70 Franchise no-poach provisions are agreements among 
competing franchisees to not hire each other’s employees and therefore fall 
within the definition of horizontal agreements under section 1.  
Proponents of the rule of reason standard, including the DOJ in its recent 
Statement of Interest, disagree with challengers’ characterization of these 
agreements. Defendants have attempted to distinguish the use of no-poach 
agreements in the franchise sector from horizontal restraints of trade by 
emphasizing that the agreements at issue are vertical.71 Under this view, because 
the no-poach provisions are contained within the franchise agreement that is 
entered into by the parent company franchisor and individual franchisees, the 
parties to the agreement have a vertical relationship.72 Vertical agreements that 
have procompetitive justifications are analyzed under the rule of reason 
standard.73  
The DOJ’s assertion that no-poach agreements are vertical is premised 
upon a mischaracterization of the relationship between the franchisor and the 
franchisee. While the relationship between the franchisor and franchisee is 
 
 64. Id. at 7, 11–12, 16. 
 65. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 888 (2007). 
 66. See id. 
 67. See id. at 890. 
 68. See Am. Ad Mgmt., Inc. v. GTE Corp., 92 F.3d 781, 784 (1996). 
 69. For example, in its franchise agreement, Jimmy John’s explicitly informs prospective franchisees that 
they will not only compete with other sandwich shop chains and fast-food restaurants, but even other Jimmy 
John’s franchisees. See Class Action Complaint, supra note 34, at 15. 
 70. See, e.g., id. 
 71. DOJ’s Statement of Interest, supra note 12, at 11. 
 72. Id. at 12. 
 73. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882, 884 (2007) (holding that the 
defendant’s minimum resale price policy was vertical because it was an agreement between the manufacturer 
and a retailer and therefore subject to the rule of reason analysis).  
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vertical with respect to their product market, the individual franchisees are 
horizontal competitors for workers in a labor market.74 The relationship at issue 
is the relationship between franchisees at the same level in the market because 
the agreement in question imposes restrictions on the franchisees’ labor and not 
their products or services.75 Thus, a finding that no-poach agreements are 
enforced horizontally and between franchisees at the same level in the market 
cuts against the argument that the rule of reason is the appropriate standard for 
courts to use. The most problematic aspect of the DOJ’s vertical agreement 
argument is that it assumes that the orientation of the restraint, rather than the 
effects of the restraint, dictates the outcome of which standard to use.76 Although 
the distinction between horizontal and vertical agreements may be relevant in 
identifying anticompetitive effects of the restraints,77 courts should avoid 
narrowly focusing on the identities of the parties to an agreement when 
determining the appropriate standard of review. 
In Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., the Supreme Court 
explained that any “departure from the rule-of-reason standard must be based 
upon demonstrable economic effect rather than . . . upon formalistic line 
drawing.” 78 Applying the Court’s reasoning in Leegin, federal courts have 
emphasized that when determining whether an agreement is horizontal or 
vertical, courts must examine the effects of the restraint rather than the characters 
that imposed it.79 In United States v. Apple, Inc., Apple argued that its price-
fixing agreements with publishers were multiple independent vertical 
agreements and thus should be subject to the rule of reason analysis.80 The 
Second Circuit disagreed, finding that the vertical contracts between Apple and 
the publishers were not the agreements that imposed a restraint of trade.81 
Instead, the restraint of trade was created by the horizontal agreement, among 
the publishers, that was organized by Apple for the purpose of eliminating 
competition from another e-book distributor.82 Finding that the publishers, 
through vertical agreements with Apple, engaged in a horizontal price-fixing 
conspiracy, the court applied the per se rule.83  
Similarly, no-poach agreements involve competing franchisees that engage 
in a horizontal conspiracy by way of vertical agreements with the parent- 
company franchisor. The restraint of trade results not from the contracts between 
 
 74. Antitrust and Economic Opportunity: Competition in Labor Markets: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Antitrust, Com., and Admin. L. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 3 (2019) (statement of Rahul 
Rao, Assistant Att’y Gen., Off. of the Att’y Gen. of Wash., Antitrust Div.) [hereinafter Statement of Rahul Rao]. 
 75. American Antitrust Institute Letter, supra note 14, at 6. 
 76. Id. 
 77. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 1503. 
 78. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 887 (2007). 
 79. See, e.g., United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 323 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 80. Id. at 321. 
 81. Id. at 325. 
 82. Id. at 321–29. 
 83. Id. at 325. 
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the franchisor and the franchisee, but from each franchisee’s refusal to hire 
employees from a competing franchisee.84 The argument to the contrary focuses 
narrowly on the character of the parties to the agreement rather than the effects 
of the agreement. The no-poach provision is only effectuated when two 
competing franchisees try to hire or retain the same employee.85 If the agreement 
was truly vertical in nature, as the DOJ suggests, it would have little practical 
effect, which would render its existence useless. There is little functional 
difference between the no-poach agreement entered into by the franchisor and 
franchisee and a no-poach agreement between the individual franchisees.86 
Because franchise no-poach agreements produce the same anticompetitive 
effects on the labor market that a direct conspiracy between the franchisees 
would likely produce, there is a strong argument that the per se rule is 
appropriate. 
Alternatively, the no-poach agreements in the franchise industry could be 
viewed under the hub-and-spoke theory and thus still warrant per se liability. A 
hub-and-spoke conspiracy involves a network of vertical agreements that are 
used to facilitate a horizontal restraint of trade amounting to a horizontal 
agreement.87 Hub-and-spoke conspiracies involve “both direct competitors and 
actors up and down the supply chain,” and thus include both horizontal and 
vertical agreements.88 If courts are reluctant to characterize some franchise no-
poach provisions as purely horizontal agreements, courts should, alternatively, 
view the use of these provisions as a hub-and-spoke conspiracy. Applying the 
hub-and-spoke theory to the franchise no-poach context, a franchisee enters into 
an agreement with its parent-company franchisor and thereby creates a vertical 
agreement. The no-poach provision, however, does not govern the vertical 
relationship between those parties. Instead, the provision governs activity among 
the individual competing franchisees and is enforced horizontally.89 Even if 
courts disagree that no-poach agreements are purely horizontal, the horizontal 
aspects of the no-poach agreements warrant the use of the per se rule.90  
 
 84. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 9–12, 17, Butler v. 
Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, 331 F. Supp. 3d 786 (S.D. Ill. 2018) (No. 3:18-CV-00133). 
 85. Statement of Rahul Rao, supra note 74, at 3. 
 86. Marshall Steinbaum, Antitrust, the Gig Economy, and Labor Market Power, 82 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 45, 52 (2019). 
 87.  In re Musical Instruments & Equip. Antitrust Litig. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Music Merch., 798 F.3d 1186, 
1192 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. F.T.C., 221 F.3d 928, 930 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that the 
defendant entered into a network of vertical agreements with other manufacturers to restrict distribution to 
certain warehouse stores). 
 88. In re Musical Instruments, 798 F.3d at 1192. 
 89. See Class Action Complaint, supra note 34, at 2 (alleging that each franchisee has independent rights 
of enforcement of the no-poach provision). 
 90. In re Musical Instruments, 798 F.3d at 1191. 
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2. Single-Entity Doctrine 
Invoking the single-entity theory, the DOJ also suggested that a franchisor 
and its franchisees may be considered a single entity for the purposes of 
antitrust.91 There is no liability under section 1 of the Sherman Act where a 
parent company and its wholly owned subsidiary have a complete unity of 
interest and enter an agreement.92 According to this theory, because the 
franchisor and franchisee are a single entity, they, by definition, cannot conspire 
together to restrain trade.93  
Courts must recognize the weaknesses of the single-entity defense as 
applied in the franchise context. The theory applies in a narrow set of 
circumstances; for example, to agreements between parent corporations and 
their wholly owned subsidiaries.94 Courts can find guidance in American Needle, 
Inc. v. National Football League, where the Supreme Court held that a joint 
venture between substantial, independently owned, and independently managed 
businesses is not immune from section 1 liability under the single-entity 
defense.95 A group of National Football League (NFL) teams pooled together 
their individual trademarks and other intellectual property in order to license 
their rights through a joint venture.96 Although the teams participated in a joint 
venture, the Court found that the teams operated through their own “separate 
corporate consciousnesses” with individual objectives.97 The Court found that 
because the NFL teams were separate economic actors, the single-entity doctrine 
could not shield them from antitrust liability.98 
Contrary to the DOJ’s argument, the single-entity doctrine is too narrow to 
encompass the relationship between a franchisor and franchisees. Franchisees 
are separate economic actors, independent not only from one another, but from 
the parent company as well.99 The franchisees are not wholly owned subsidiaries 
of the franchisor parent company.100 Franchisees, like the NFL teams in 
American Needle, are independently owned and operated.101In their franchise 
arrangements, many franchisors clarify that their franchisees are neither agents, 
joint venturers, partners, nor employees of the parent company.102 Even more 
 
 91. DOJ’s Statement of Interest, supra note 12, at 5–7. 
 92. Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984). However, courts will focus on 
substance rather than form to determine whether two parties can conspire under section 1. See id. at 773 n.21.  
 93. Id. at 777. 
 94. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183 (2010). 
 95. Id. at 196. 
 96. Id. at 187. 
 97. Id. at 184. 
 98. Id. at 197, 204. 
 99. See, e.g., Class Action Complaint, supra note 34, at 1; see also Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH)  
¶ 6349(1)(a)(1) (2018) (“[T]he franchisee is an independent businessman . . . .”). 
 100. John A. Capobianco, Note, In Restraint of Wages: The Implications of “No-Poaching” Agreements, 
33 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 419, 436 (2019). 
 101. Jimmy John’s, for example, makes clear to its franchisees that they are responsible for their own day-
to-day operations. Class Action Complaint, supra note 34, at 13. 
 102. See, e.g., id. at 13. 
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relevant here is that franchisors often play no role in the employment practices 
or labor relations of the franchisees.103 Franchisors do not set or regulate 
franchisee costs of operation, including wages for employees.104 In a typical 
arrangement, franchisors also do not control the hiring of employees, training, 
promotions, terminations, hours worked, employee benefits, or working 
conditions within franchisees.105  
Courts should receive DOJ’s single entity argument with skepticism. The 
argument that the franchisor and its franchisees are so intertwined that they 
cannot conspire with one another finds little support in reality. Courts should 
look to the governing agreement between a franchisor and a franchisee and 
evaluate the extent to which each franchisee is given autonomy and 
independence in operating its business. Franchisees that retain a significant 
amount of responsibilities, control, and discretion in the operation of the 
business should not be immune from antitrust liability for its agreements with 
its parent company. 
3. Ancillary Restraint v. Naked Restraint 
Although the DOJ advanced several arguments against the application of 
the per se rule, the dispute regarding which standard should govern is likely to 
turn on the issue of whether these restraints are naked or ancillary. Even if the 
existence of a horizontal agreement between competitors were established, the 
court would also need to determine whether the restraint on trade is “naked” or 
“ancillary.”106  
A horizontal agreement is considered a naked restraint on trade if it has the 
purpose or likely effect of increasing price or decreasing output and is unrelated 
to joint economic activity between parties.107 Naked restraints on trade are 
presumed anticompetitive and are thus per se illegal.108 Once the court concludes 
that the restraint at issue is naked, no further inquiry into the merits of a 
particular restraint is necessary.109 In its earlier policy statement with the FTC, 
 
 103. See Andrew Elmore, Franchise Regulation for the Fissured Economy, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 907, 
934–36 (2018) (discussing the lack of control that franchisors exercise over franchisees with respect to day-to-
day operations and franchisee employees); see also Patterson v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 333 P.3d 723, 740–42 
(Cal. 2014) (holding that plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence that franchisor Domino’s controlled the 
day-to-day aspects of its franchisee’s employment and employee conduct). 
 104. See, e.g., Class Action Complaint, supra note 34, at 17; see also Lydia DePillis, Why Franchises Are 
Such a Huge Obstacle to Higher Wages, WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2013, 11:26 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/12/06/why-franchises-are-the-biggest-obstacle-to-
higher-wages/ (discussing franchisor’s ability to “abdicate responsibility for wages and working conditions” at 
its franchisee workplaces). 
 105. See, e.g., Class Action Complaint, supra note 34, at 17; Orozco v. Plackis, 757 F.3d 445, 450 (5th Cir. 
2014) (finding insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the franchisor supervised or controlled franchisee’s 
employee work schedules or conditions). 
 106. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 1906. 
 107. Id. ¶ 1906a. 
 108. Id. ¶ 1910. 
 109. Id. ¶ 1910b. 
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the DOJ stated that the per se rule applied where the no-poach agreements were 
“naked,” or “separate from or not reasonably necessary to a larger legitimate 
collaboration between the employers.”110 
A restraint is ancillary if its objectively intended purpose or likely effect is 
lower prices, increased output, or is an otherwise profitable or rational decision 
for the participants.111 To be ancillary, an agreement must be subordinate or 
collateral to a separate, legitimate transaction.112 The agreement must be 
reasonably necessary to facilitate the main transaction in accomplishing its 
broader purpose.113 Although not all ancillary agreements are lawful, there is a 
strong presumption that they do not violate antitrust law.114 
Applying the ancillary restraint doctrine, the Supreme Court in Broadcast 
Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc. applied the rule of reason 
standard although the agreements at issue were horizontal.115 Broadcast Music 
involved a blanket licensing agreement whereby copyright owners of musical 
compositions licensed their compositions collectively.116 By purchasing the 
blanket license, licensees could publicly perform any of the works included in 
the license rather than negotiate rights individually with each copyright 
owner.117 The Court found that the defendants’ blanket license was reasonably 
ancillary to a legitimate business transaction because it increased market 
efficiencies.118 The business venture required a certain degree of cooperation 
between competitors and the restraint was necessary to facilitate that 
cooperation.119 Unlike a naked restraint that is presumed to have no 
procompetitive justifications, ancillary restraints like the license in Broadcast 
Music warrant a more comprehensive rule of reason analysis to determine 
section 1 liability.120  
In its Statement of Interest, the DOJ invoked the ancillary restraint doctrine 
and argued that, like the blanket license in Broadcast Music, some franchise no-
poach agreements are reasonably necessary to the franchise collaboration and 
yield legitimate benefits.121 According to its theory, by limiting intrabrand 
competition, no-poach agreements may actually foster interbrand 
competition.122 The no-poach agreements can ensure uniformity of the 
franchise’s brand and quality of service, which is necessary for a franchise 
 
 110. 2016 JOINT POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 10, at 3. 
 111. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 1905. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. ¶ 1912. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 15 (1979). 
 116. Id. at 5. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 23. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
 121. DOJ’s Statement of Interest, supra note 12, at 3. 
 122. Id. at 12. 
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system’s success.123 Interbrand competition is encouraged because, 
theoretically, it yields benefits to consumers.124  
However, the argument that the no-poach agreements are ancillary because 
they provide potential benefits to consumers overlooks a key issue. The no-
poach agreements restrain trade in the labor market, not the product market that 
the franchisees serve.125 By limiting output in the labor market, the no-poach 
agreements directly affect employees, not consumers.126 To determine whether 
a restraint may offer procompetitive effects, the court should consider 
procompetitive effects in the market in which the restraint directly occurs.127 
Here, the restraint caused by no-poach agreements directly occurs in the labor 
market, not the product market.128 Thus, the court should examine the benefits, 
or lack thereof, of a restraint on employees in the labor market. Even if 
defendants can show that these agreements promote interbrand competition in 
the product market, this would be an out-of-market benefit that would not excuse 
the restraint at issue.129  
Additionally, unlike the cases in which courts applied the ancillary restraint 
doctrine, franchise no-poach cases do not involve an industry in which 
restrictions on competition are essential for its existence. For example, courts 
have recognized that unusual business ventures like group music licensing and 
sports leagues require cooperation among competitors.130 The DOJ failed to 
explain why a restraint on labor market competition is necessary for franchisees 
to produce their products and services.131 Franchise defendants have argued that 
no-poach agreements protect franchisees’ investments in providing specific 
training for its workers. In an industry with a high turnover rate, franchisees use 
these agreements to ensure that the net returns from training shift in the direction 
of the employer.132 This argument fails to prove or explain how the training 
would be lost to the franchisees without the use of no-poach agreements. If this 
argument were true, it would essentially concede that franchisees are in fact 
separate economic actors, cutting against the single-entity theory. If the 
franchisees were a single entity operating under one brand, as rule of reason 
 
 123. Id.  
 124. Id. 
 125. American Antitrust Institute Letter, supra note 14, at 3. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Masterman, supra note 35, at 1414. 
 128. Id. 
 129. American Antitrust Institute Letter, supra note 14, at 8. 
 130. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic 
Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
 131. See DOJ’s Statement of Interest, supra note 12. While the DOJ argued that no-poach agreements could 
qualify as ancillary restraints if they are reasonably necessary to a legitimate joint activity, it did not explain why 
these restraints are necessary to the franchise agreement. See id. at 13, 16–17. 
 132. See Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended 
Complaint Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(B)(1) and 12(B)(6) at 8, 14, Butler v. Jimmy John’s 
Franchise, LLC, 331 F. Supp. 3d 786 (S.D. Ill. 2018) (No. 3:18-CV-00133) [hereinafter Defendants’ 
Memorandum in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint]. 
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proponents have argued, an employee who benefits from the training provided 
by one franchisee could transfer those same skills to another franchisee without 
the risk of the franchise brand losing its investments. 
Additionally, no-poach provisions are not ancillary because they are not 
reasonably necessary to effectuate the broader purpose of the franchise 
agreement. To constitute an ancillary restraint, the restraint must be reasonably 
tailored to further pro-competitive justifications.133 The DOJ failed to 
demonstrate how no-poach provisions could be considered reasonably tailored 
to achieve the purported procompetitive benefits. It offered no evidence to 
suggest that the survival of a franchise system depends upon retaining 
employees and decreasing turnover. In fact, there is evidence suggesting 
otherwise. Following a series of investigations and civil settlements, 150 
companies in the state of Washington have removed no-poach provisions from 
their franchise agreements.134 Additionally, a minority of franchise systems in 
Washington did not use these no-poach agreements to begin with.135 If the 
purported purpose of the no-poach agreements were to maintain brand 
uniformity and increase interbrand competition, it is likely that the franchise 
model could achieve this goal without restraining competition in the labor 
market.136 
There are more efficient and procompetitive means to protect franchisees’ 
investments in employees. Employers can offer bonuses for employees who stay 
with the franchisees for a certain amount of time. Additionally, employers can 
offer competitive wages that attract and retain qualified employees. These are 
just a few examples of solutions that employers can implement to avoid 
employee turnover and a loss of investment—the consequences that the no-
poach agreements purportedly prevent—and also contribute to a competitive 
labor market. Just as firms make investments and developments in their products 
in order to attract consumers and compete in the product market, employers must 
create and maintain conditions that attract employees in the labor market. 
The DOJ’s arguments in support of rule of reason are grounded in a 
mischaracterization of the franchise system and fail to explain why an 
employer’s involvement in a franchise system warrants a departure from existing 
section 1 precedent. Although the reasoning in its Statement of Interest is subject 
 
 133. See, e.g., Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 7–8 (2006). 
 134. Statement of Rahul Rao, supra note 74, at 2–3.  
 135. Id.  
 136. “The economic underpinnings of franchising center around brand names and the public’s perception of 
quality and uniformity associated with those brand names.” David J. Kaufmann, Felicia N. Soler, Breton H. 
Permesly & Dale A. Cohen, A Franchisor Is Not the Employer of Its Franchisees or Their Employees, 34 
FRANCHISE L.J. 439, 453 (2015). Franchisors can take a variety of measures to ensure that the quality of its 
goods and services are uniform among franchisees and promote the franchise brand. See id. at 454–55. 
Franchisors can ensure high quality products by prescribing rigorous production standards with which 
franchisees must comply. Additionally, franchisors can ensure brand uniformity by prescribing standards for a 
franchisee location’s physical appearance, employee uniforms, and use of its trademarks. See id. 
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to criticism, the DOJ provided defendants additional support to use as leverage 
in recent no-poach cases. 
II.  THE DOJ’S INCONSISTENT POSITIONS 
The DOJ has weighed in on the issue of no-poach agreements twice in the 
past decade: first in 2016 in its joint policy statement with the FTC,137 and again 
in 2019 when the DOJ filed a statement of interest in a no-poach case to which 
it was not a party.138 As more no-poach agreements become the subjects of 
litigation, courts will likely consider the extent to which the DOJ’s guidance on 
the matter should shape the outcome. 
A. 2016 DOJ AND FTC JOINT POLICY STATEMENT 
The DOJ and FTC are joint enforcers of federal antitrust law.139 In October 
2016, the Antitrust Division of the DOJ and the FTC published a joint policy 
statement titled Antitrust Guidance for Human Resource Professionals.140 In this 
statement, the DOJ and the FTC established important guidelines for antitrust 
compliance in the labor market. Specifically, the statement established that 
naked no-poach agreements among employers are per se illegal and may be 
subject to criminal prosecution under section 1 of the Sherman Act.141 First 
stating that firms that compete for employees are considered competitors under 
antitrust law, the DOJ and the FTC then plainly state that “naked wage-fixing or 
no-poaching agreements among employers, whether entered into directly or 
through a third-party intermediary, are per se illegal under the antitrust laws.”142 
The use of naked no-poach agreements in the franchise sector is the type of 
conduct the DOJ and FTC appears to condemn in its 2016 Joint Policy statement. 
Through their policy statement, the DOJ and FTC intended to put firms, like 
franchise systems, on notice that such agreements are per se illegal.143  
B. PRIOR ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS BROUGHT BY THE DOJ 
Both before and after the DOJ communicated its position in the 2016 Joint 
Policy, its civil enforcement efforts have utilized the per se approach to 
challenge no-poach agreements.  
Under the Obama Administration, the DOJ investigated the employment 
and recruitment practices of several technology companies in the Silicon Valley. 
After concluding that the firms entered agreements that were per se illegal under 
 
 137. See 2016 JOINT POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 10. 
 138. See DOJ’s Statement of Interest, supra note 12. 
 139. 2016 JOINT POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 10, at 1. 
 140. Id.  
 141. Id. at 3.  
 142. Id. (emphasis added). 
 143. See id. at 3–4. 
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antitrust law, the DOJ brought a civil suit against the companies in 2010.144 The 
competing firms expressly agreed to not solicit current employees of the other 
firms involved in the bilateral agreement.145 The DOJ concluded that these 
agreements were facially anticompetitive and “disrupted the normal price-
setting mechanisms that apply in the labor setting.”146 For this reason, the DOJ 
characterized this agreement as a naked restraint of trade under antitrust law.147 
To settle the matter, the defendant firms agreed to refrain from enforcing or 
entering into similar no-poach agreements.148 
In 2019, the DOJ, under the Trump Administration, filed a civil complaint 
against two rail equipment suppliers for implementing and maintaining a long-
running no-poach agreement.149 The DOJ noted that the agreement technically 
warranted criminal charges, but, in an exercise of prosecutorial discretion, the 
Agency decided to pursue only civil violations for no-poach agreements entered 
into before its 2016 Joint Policy announcements.150 The DOJ argued that the no-
poach agreements were per se illegal because they substantially reduced 
competition for employees and were not necessary to a legitimate business 
transaction.151  
Although the DOJ followed through with its communicated intention to 
challenge no-poach agreements as per se illegal, the DOJ’s warning of criminal 
enforcement has remained only a warning. The DOJ’s 2016 Joint Policy 
provided that naked no-poach agreements are subject to criminal prosecution.152 
The DOJ further emphasized the potential in 2017 when then-DOJ Antitrust 
Division chief Makan Delrahim announced that criminal no-poach enforcement 
was a “high priority” for the department.153 Despite these announcements, the 
DOJ has yet to bring a criminal no-poach case.154 The DOJ’s position on no-
 
 144. Complaint at 2, United States v. Adobe Sys., Inc., No. 10 CV 1629, 2011 WL 10883994 (D.D.C. Mar. 
18, 2011) (No. 1:10-CV-01629). 
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(D.D.C. July 11, 2018) (No. 1:18-cv-00747). 
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6:26 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1205315. 
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for Labor Market Collusion (Jan. 7, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/health-care-company-indicted-labor-
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DOJ, under new leadership, may approach franchise no-poach agreements in the future.  
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poach agreements, as articulated in policy statements and public 
announcements, now appears less emphatic due to the lack of criminal 
prosecutions and its 2019 Statement of Interest.  
C. IMPACT OF THE DOJ’S STATEMENT OF INTEREST 
In tension with its previous civil enforcements and official policy 
statements, the DOJ recently argued that some well-established antitrust 
principles regarding the use of no-poach agreements do not apply in the 
franchise sector.155 This position, albeit flawed, now forms one of the bases of 
the franchise defendants’ arguments in no-poach litigation.156 In 2016, the DOJ 
seemed to clearly articulate its position regarding enforcement of no-poach 
agreements in the labor market.157 Three years later, in three private civil cases, 
the DOJ filed a statement of interest in which it advocated for a different 
approach to examine no-poach agreements when they are used in the franchise 
sector.158 In its Statement of Interest, the DOJ argued that a court must examine 
each franchisor-franchisee relationship on a case-by-case basis in order to 
determine which legal standard should apply.159 The DOJ’s argument relies 
upon the ancillary restraint doctrine, which, as previously discussed, should not 
apply to the use of no-poach agreements in the franchise sector.  
The DOJ’s Statement of Interest received the attention and criticism of 
other key players in antitrust law, signaling a disagreement regarding the 
appropriate standard under which franchise no-poach agreements should be 
analyzed. Due in part to this disagreement in the antitrust community, courts 
have relucted to issue broad pronouncements regarding the appropriate standard 
of review for franchise no-poach agreements.  
1. Responses to the DOJ’s Statement of Interest  
In response to the DOJ’s Statement of Interest, the American Antitrust 
Institute expressed its concern that the DOJ’s position will misguide district 
courts and discourage antitrust plaintiffs from challenging these no-poach 
agreements.160 It communicated its position that no-poach agreements in the 
franchise industry will inevitably harm labor market competition and have no 
identifiable efficiencies that would warrant the application of the rule of reason 
standard.161 
 
 155. See DOJ’s Statement of Interest, supra note 12, at 11. 
 156. See, e.g., Bryan Koenig, Jimmy John’s Cites DOJ’s No-Poach Ammo in Dismissal Bid, LAW360 (Mar. 
15, 2019, 10:23 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1139458/jimmy-john-s-cites-doj-s-no-poach-ammo-in-
dismissal-bid. 
 157. 2016 JOINT POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 10, at 3. 
 158. See DOJ’s Statement of Interest, supra note 12. 
 159. Id. 
 160. American Antitrust Institute Letter, supra note 14, at 1. 
 161. Id. at 2. 
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The DOJ’s statement also prompted criticism from the antitrust 
subcommittee of the United States House of Representatives. In a letter sent to 
Makan Delrahim, then-chief of the DOJ’s Antitrust Division, subcommittee 
chairman Representative David Cicilline expressed concern regarding the 
division’s increased involvement, by way of amicus briefs and statements of 
interests, in cases where the United States is not a party.162 The letter noted that 
the “Division’s decision to intervene has risked undermining enforcement 
efforts by state attorneys general and the Federal Trade Commission, raising 
serious questions about the Division’s motives and judgment.”163 The letter 
singled out the DOJ’s Statement of Interest with regard to no-poach agreements 
in franchising contracts and cited to “numerous experts and scholars” who have 
rejected the DOJ’s position, while also acknowleding its contradiction with 
previous statements the DOJ made regarding labor market restraints.164 Finally, 
the subcommittee argued that the DOJ’s “decision to interfere in order to win 
greater protection for corporate franchisors that restrict labor market 
competition . . . reflects grossly misshapen priorities.”165  
2. Case Example: Jimmy John’s 
The shift in the DOJ’s position on no-poach agreements has left courts 
reluctant to determine which standard is appropriate when reviewing no-poach 
agreements and has provided support to defendants in these actions.166 A recent 
case, Butler v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, illustrates the nature of no-poach 
agreements and their implications in the franchise sector.167 This case, still 
ongoing in district court, is emblematic not only of a typical no-poach provision 
in a franchise agreement but also of the lack of clarity regarding the appropriate 
standard of review for these agreements. 
Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC (“Jimmy John’s”) is the franchisor of the 
Jimmy John’s system.168 Jimmy John’s is a sandwich store chain with over 2,700 
locations in over forty states.169 The franchise restaurants employ tens of 
 
 162. Letter from David N. Cicilline, Chairman, Subcomm. on Antitrust, Com., & Admin. Law, U.S. House 
of Reps., to Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Just. 1 (May 22, 2019), 
https://cicilline.house.gov/sites/cicilline.house.gov/files/documents/DOJ_05222019.pdf. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 2–3. 
 165. Id. at 4. 
 166. In several franchise no-poach cases, the courts have declined to decide, at the motion to dismiss stage, 
the appropriate standard of review to apply in the case. See, e.g., Butler v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, 331 
F. Supp. 3d 786, 797 (S.D. Ill. 2018); Blanton v. Domino’s Pizza Franchising LLC, No. 18-13207, 2019 WL 
2247731, at *1 (E.D. Mich. May 24, 2019); Fuentes v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC, No. CV 18-5174, 2019 WL 
7584654, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2019); Robinson v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., No. 19-9066 (SDW) (LDW), 2019 
WL 5617512, at *7 (D.N.J. Oct. 31, 2019); In re Papa John’s Emp. & Franchisee Emp. Antitrust Litig., No. 
3:18-CV-00825-JHM, 2019 WL 5386484, at *9 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 21, 2019). 
 167. See Butler, 331 F. Supp. 3d 786. 
 168. Class Action Complaint, supra note 34, at 1. 
 169. Id. 
1594 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 72:1573 
thousands of workers across the United States.170 Jimmy John’s enters into 
franchise agreements with franchise owners, and each franchise is an 
independently owned and operated business.171  
Franchise restaurants are responsible for their own day-to-day operations, 
including all employment practices.172 In its franchise agreement, Jimmy John’s 
specifically clarifies that it plays no role in the franchisees’ employment 
practices or labor relations.173 Beginning no later than 2012, and likely back to 
at least 2007, the Jimmy John’s franchise agreement contained a provision that 
required each franchisee to agree to not “hire as an employee” any person who 
currently is, or within the preceding twelve months was, employed by another 
Jimmy John’s franchisee.174 Additionally, franchisee employees were restricted, 
“as a condition of their employment,” from hiring employees from other Jimmy 
John’s franchisee restaurants.175 Franchise agreements executed in 2015, 2016, 
and 2017 contained a provision prohibiting franchisees from soliciting or 
initiating recruitment of other franchisees’ employees.176 These contracts also 
explicitly indicate that the franchisees are “third party beneficiaries” of the 
agreement and have independent rights of enforcement.177 When entering into 
the franchise agreements, franchisees agreed to pay $50,000 for each violation 
of the no-poach provision.178 Additionally, Jimmy John’s reserved the right to 
terminate a franchise agreement entirely for violation of the no-poach 
provision.179 
The plaintiff in this case, Sylas Butler, was a part-time employee at a 
Jimmy John’s restaurant location in Illinois.180 During his time working at the 
restaurant, Butler was paid minimum wage.181 In January 2017, after Butler’s 
supervising manager reduced his hours per week, Butler quit his job at that 
particular restaurant in order to obtain employment at a different location that 
could offer him more hours.182 Butler was not eligible for hire at any other 
Jimmy John’s location because of the existing no-poach agreements among 
franchise locations.183 
In January of 2018, Butler filed a class action lawsuit against Jimmy John’s 
in Illinois federal district court.184 He alleged that Jimmy John’s no-poach 
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agreements violate section 1 of the Sherman Act and that he suffered suppressed 
wages and diminished employment opportunities as a result of the defendant’s 
anticompetitive conduct.185  
Jimmy John’s moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint, arguing that the 
plaintiff lacked standing to bring the suit, and, alternatively, that he failed to 
state a plausible section 1 claim.186 It argued that intrabrand no-hire agreements 
are not per se unlawful and are instead subject to the rule of reason analysis.187 
Jimmy John’s reasoned that because the franchise agreements are between 
Jimmy John’s—the franchisor —and its franchisees, the agreements are vertical 
and are thus not subject to per se liability under section 1 of the Sherman Act.188  
Jimmy John’s argued that even if the plaintiff’s claim could proceed under 
the rule of reason test, it would ultimately fail.189 Under Jimmy John’s theory, 
procompetitive justifications for no-poach agreements outweigh any alleged 
potential harm.190 According to its argument, franchisees invest significant 
resources in hiring, training, and retaining employees.191 Preventing employees 
from “free-riding” at the franchise level within the Jimmy John’s system protects 
these investments and promotes Jimmy John’s products, thereby encouraging 
interbrand competition with other fast-food franchises outside of the Jimmy 
John’s brand.192 
The district court rejected Jimmy John’s argument that the plaintiff lacked 
standing to bring the suit and allowed the case to proceed.193 However, the court 
declined to decide which standard of review should apply because it was too 
early to decide.194 The judge noted that plaintiffs would have to provide 
“Herculean” evidence of franchise independence to invoke the per se 
standard.195 In a second attempt to dismiss the lawsuit, Jimmy John’s relied upon 
the DOJ Statement of Interest which advocated for the rule of reason 
approach.196 With a new judge presiding, the court once again denied Jimmy 
John’s motion to dismiss and declined to conclude the appropriate standard of 
review, noting that “the legal questions here are in their infancy, and this battle 
looks like one that will make its way through the courts for years to come. This 
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case in particular may end up being the vanguard in that battle.”197 The litigation 
involving Jimmy John’s is still ongoing in district court. 
As articulated by the judge in Butler v. Jimmy John’s, courts appear 
reluctant to determine the appropriate standard at the motion to dismiss stage as 
they grapple with the unresolved issue.198 The DOJ’s recent Statement of 
Interest, and its apparent departure from its previous guidance and enforcement 
efforts, likely contributed to the lack of clarity on that point. 
3. Varied Approaches to No-Poach Litigation  
The disagreement among key players in the world of antitrust law signals 
uncertainty for the future of no-poach agreements in the franchise industry. This 
uncertainty is reflected in recent cases in which federal district courts across the 
nation grappled with the issue. Six courts, including the court in Butler v. Jimmy 
John’s, concluded that the plaintiffs had plausibly alleged horizontal restraints 
of trade but nevertheless declined to resolve the issue of the appropriate standard 
at the motion to dismiss stage.199 A federal district court in Michigan, however, 
agreed with the defendant and applied the rule of reason standard at the motion 
to dismiss stage, where it ultimately dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint for 
failure to sufficiently allege an unreasonable restraint.200 Another court 
dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint after holding that the single-entity doctrine 
applied and thus precluded section 1 liability.201 
The extent to which the DOJ’s positions on the issue influenced the courts’ 
analyses in these franchise no-poach cases is unclear. In many of these cases, 
the plaintiffs relied upon the DOJ and FTC 2016 Joint Policy to support their 
contention that the per se rule should apply to their claims. The DOJ’s 2019 
Statement of Interest provided defendants with a tool to not only undermine the 
plaintiff’s use of the 2016 guidance but also advance their arguments that the 
rule of reason is the appropriate standard.202 Although the DOJ’s statements in 
the 2016 Joint Policy and its subsequent 2019 Statement of Interest are not 
binding on courts, the DOJ’s guidance on antitrust law is considered persuasive 
authority. 
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Litigants and courts value guidance from the DOJ’s Antitrust Division, one 
of the federal antitrust enforcement arms, due in part to the nuanced economic 
and market analysis involved in antitrust law.203 For example, although the 
DOJ’s merger guidelines do not bind courts’ review of proposed mergers, courts 
have viewed the guidelines as a helpful framework for their own analyses.204 A 
2019 analysis examined thirty-two filings, including amicus briefs and 
statements of interest, filed by the DOJ under the leadership of then-Assistant 
Attorney General for Antitrust, Makan Delrahim.205 Delrahim explained that the 
purpose of the filings is to “address developments in the case law earlier and 
more frequently, offering [the DOJ] the opportunity to have an outsized impact 
with [the DOJ’s] resources.”206 Of nineteen cases that had been resolved at the 
time of the analysis, the courts agreed with the DOJ’s position in eight and 
disagreed with the DOJ’s position in five.207 
The DOJ’s position on franchise no-poach agreements, as asserted in its 
Statement of Interest, does not bind the courts.208 Courts should reject the DOJ’s 
position that not all franchise no-poach agreements are per se illegal because of 
the flawed reasoning that underlies that argument. The application of the per se 
standard to franchise no-poach agreements is not only supported by section 1 
precedent, but it is also supported by policy considerations. 
III.  THE FUTURE OF FRANCHISE NO-POACH AGREEMENTS 
Although the dispute regarding the appropriate standard of review for no-
poach agreements may seem like a mere nuance in antitrust law, the resolution 
of the dispute has important implications for workers in the United States. Courts 
must consider the ways in which the use of no-poach agreements in the franchise 
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industry yields tangible effects on American workers and the economy in 
general. The courts are equipped to resolve the franchise no-poach problem; 
however, other non-judicial solutions may provide more immediate and 
effective results.  
A. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS  
When determining the appropriate standard under which franchise no-
poach agreements should be reviewed, courts should account for the public 
policy implications of their decisions. The no-poach agreements at issue here 
harm employees by effectively suppressing wages, reducing their bargaining 
power, and restricting their mobility.209 Although protecting employees in the 
labor market is not the sole purpose of antitrust law, antitrust law is an important 
tool for ensuring healthy competition for American workers.210 Antitrust law 
aims to encourage free markets with procompetitive benefits to both consumers 
and employees.211 Its ultimate goal is to not only retroactively punish antitrust 
violations but to prevent them altogether.212 Using the per se standard to analyze 
no-poach agreements will prevent franchisors from using these agreements 
altogether and thus encourage robust competition in the labor market.  
No-poach agreements expand the already existing problem with labor 
mobility in America. Over the past few decades, American employees were less 
likely “to move to new places and start new jobs.”213 One explanation for a lack 
of mobility in the labor market is a lack of competition.214 When employees have 
more options for employment, employers will compete more effectively for their 
labor.215 
No-poach agreements harm employees by tending to deprive them of better 
job growth or mobility opportunities.216 A franchisee employee may choose to 
seek employment at a different franchisee location for a variety of reasons. An 
employee may wish to move to a franchisee location at which he or she is 
scheduled to work more hours per week, is given a more flexible schedule, or 
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offered promotional opportunities.217 Additionally, depending on external 
factors, employees may need to work at a franchisee location that is 
geographically more convenient. The no-poach agreements restrict workers’ 
outside options and thus limit their job growth and opportunities.218  
A lack of worker mobility is a contributing factor to the long-term 
macroeconomic trend of stagnant wages and rising inequality across the 
country.219 In 2017, the national unemployment rate reached a sixteen-year low 
and the number of available jobs reached an all-time high; however, wage 
growth has remained fairly stagnant.220 When labor is “perfectly” mobile, the 
labor supply is elastic and thus low wages will prompt employee migration.221 
In a normal labor market without restraints like no-poach agreements, 
employees seeking higher wages will either solicit a raise from their employer 
or seek employment elsewhere.222 The use of no-poach agreements, however, 
has distorted the price-setting mechanisms that would otherwise apply in a 
normal labor market.223 Analogous to the way that price-fixing agreements 
produce higher prices for consumers, no-poach agreements produce lower 
wages for employees.224 Just as decreased competition in a product market 
enables firms to raise prices without a decrease in demand, restricted 
competition in a labor market enables employers to suppress workers’ wages 
without fear of them leaving.225 
No-poach agreements are especially problematic because they pose 
potential wage suppression for individuals who are already paid low wages. No-
poach agreements are common in the fast-food industry.226 The average fast-
food worker earns $300 per week before taxes.227 According to a 2014 study, 
12% of workers earning less than $40,000 annually with below-college-level 
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education were restricted by non-compete or no-poach covenants.228 No-poach 
agreements between franchisees also threaten wages by facilitating 
opportunities for additional collusion.229 When no-poach agreements are in 
place, franchisees are in a stronger position to expressly fix wages.230 
In an already unequal power dynamic between an employer and 
employee,231 no-poach agreements provide unfair bargaining power to 
employers at the expense of the employees.232 In a labor market free from 
restraints, employees are generally free to seek new employment opportunities 
if they are dissatisfied at a current workplace.233 If their wages are suppressed, 
employees can seek work with a higher-paying employer.234 If their hours are 
cut or if they are not offered adequate benefits, employees can seek work with 
an employer who offers a more attractive benefits package and a flexible 
schedule.235 However, these no-poach agreements limit employees’ ability to 
respond to inadequacies or changes in their workplace. Employers have unfair 
leverage over their employees because employees implicated by these 
provisions cannot easily transfer to a different location within the same franchise 
system.236 The employers experience less pressure to offer competitive wages, 
benefits, or work schedules because the risk of losing a significant number of 
employees is low.237 The no-poach agreements allow employers to keep labor 
costs low at the expense of their employees.238 Additionally, forces that impede 
labor mobility can contribute to the market power that some of the firms already 
have.239  
Furthermore, the individuals who are directly inhibited by these 
agreements, the employees themselves, are often unaware that these provisions 
even exist.240 Most employees never see the no-poach provisions and thus are 
not aware of them until they are actually restricted by them, because these 
provisions are contained within the franchise agreements.241 The lack of 
transparency regarding the no-poach agreements further distorts the bargaining 
power between the employee and employer. 
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B. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS  
Without an effective solution, the use of no-poach agreements will 
continue to harm employees and perpetuate economic inequality. The treatment 
of no-poach agreements in antitrust law will likely continue to develop in court, 
inviting different theories on the correct approaches that courts should take. The 
nature of the franchisor-franchisee relationship itself has prompted various 
defensive arguments which attempt to shield, and in some cases have 
successfully shielded, these entities from liability. Solutions to this problem are 
available through each of the three branches of the federal government—the 
courts, the executive branch through the DOJ, and the legislature. States can also 
address the problem through legislation or effective enforcement efforts. 
First, courts should reject the DOJ’s position and decline to apply the rule 
of reason standard to franchise no-poach agreements. Given the prevalence of 
these no-poach agreements in the franchise sector and other industries242 and 
their harmful effects, litigation will likely continue. If courts apply the rule of 
reason as the uniform standard under which no-poach agreements must be 
analyzed, plaintiffs are unlikely to receive any meaningful remedy for their 
injuries. One of the most influential economists and jurists Richard Posner once 
described the rule of reason as “little more than a euphemism for nonliability.”243 
Ninety-seven percent of all antitrust cases examined under the rule of reason 
standard are dismissed at the pleading stage, largely due to the high burden of 
proof that plaintiffs must meet.244  
The per se rule allows courts and victims to preserve resources and avoid 
complicated and expensive litigation. When the per se rule applies, plaintiffs do 
not have to conduct a costly economic investigation into the industry in order to 
demonstrate that a particular restraint is unreasonable.245 The per se standard 
achieves a judicial economy by allowing courts, drawing on their experience, to 
predict with confidence that the restraint will produce anticompetitive effects.246 
If the courts take a clear stance on the issue of franchise no-poach agreements, 
franchise systems can modify their franchise agreements and practices 
accordingly.  
Second, the DOJ should reconsider the position it articulated in its 
Statement of Interest in light of existing section 1 jurisprudence, successful 
enforcement efforts by state attorneys general, and important policy objectives. 
If the DOJ were to adopt a clear stance on this issue and advocate for the per se 
rule, courts may be less reluctant to determine the appropriate standard of 
review. A revised position on the issue would also allow the DOJ to reconcile 
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the tension between its franchise no-poach position and its previous 2016 Joint 
Policy with the FTC.  
Lastly, legislation is likely the most effective means to eliminate the use of 
no-poach agreements and adequately address the exploitation of buyer power in 
labor markets. In 2018, Senators Elizabeth Warren and Cory Booker attempted 
to do so by introducing legislation titled the “End Employer Collusion Act.”247 
The bill prohibits no-poach agreements entirely, providing a private right of 
action and giving the FTC enforcement authority.248 The bill was reintroduced 
to the Senate in July of 2019, but further action has yet to be taken.249 If enacted, 
this legislation could enable federal enforcement that could supplement 
enforcement efforts at the state level. 
Even if efforts at legislation fail at the federal level, states could also raise 
standards for franchise workers by banning no-poach agreements. While no state 
has adopted such a law, action by even some states could incentivize franchise 
systems to eliminate the use of these agreements entirely. Although state laws 
could differ in scope and conflict with those of other states, franchise systems 
may likely remove no-poach provisions from their agreements to avoid no-
poach litigation entirely. As demonstrated by the large number of franchise 
systems that have already agreed to end their use of no-poach agreements in 
connection with settlements with state enforcement authorities,250 legislation at 
either the state or federal level could likely curb the use of these no-poach 
provisions entirely. 
CONCLUSION 
Although no-poach agreements have been in use for decades, their future 
in antitrust law remains uncertain. In developing antitrust jurisprudence, courts 
can seek guidance from the agencies that are responsible for enforcing antitrust 
laws. However, when the major authorities in the world of antitrust law disagree, 
courts are left to analyze a complex issue with conflicting guidance. The courts’ 
approaches to franchise no-poach cases will have far-reaching implications that 
significantly impact workers. Although the DOJ is an important actor in antitrust 
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law and enforcement, its recent position on the issue overlooks key features of 
the franchise industry and has bolstered the franchisors’ defenses in no-poach 
litigation. If implemented, the DOJ’s proposed standard could insulate violators 
of antitrust laws designed to protect against the dangers of corporate power.  
Courts should reject the DOJ’s position that the nature of the franchise 
industry warrants a departure from the rule that no-poach agreements are per se 
illegal under section 1 of the Sherman Act. The DOJ should revisit its position 
in its Statement of Interest and advocate for a bright-line per se rule for all no-
poach agreements, including those implemented by franchise systems. 
Alternatively, legislation at the state or federal level could eliminate any 
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